Tom, what REALLY annoys me in all this discussion is that you (and others) are not talking about the actions of individuals, but of the actions of the FRENCH (and, to a lesser extent, the BRITISH), and you are putting them in a way that fits your pre-conceived idea about them (you might call it anglo-saxon superiority complex).
For example, in your opinion the french should have blindly trusted the british when they saw torpedo bombers heading towards their harbour; the reason they did not is that they are stupid french. At the same time, the british were smart in not trusting that the french will not give their fleet to the germans, and you justify this belief even after the 1942 Toulon facts showed that they meant every word of it. [just to remove extra misunderstandings: I'm saying this only for comparing your attitudes to two trust-involving events, and NOT saying that the british decisions were stupid, given what they knew at the time]
Apart from that, I think that Gensoul was stupid; but we are talking about Gensoul, not "the french". Given the actual orders he received from Darlan, I think it's very likely that a different commanding officer might have avoided the fighting entirely.
Finally, two more "technical" issues.
First, the emissary: my point is not that Gensoul was right, my point is that there was no reason to irritate your counter-part by not using every persuasion method available, including flattery.
Second, about torpedo bombers, you are right that in part I am making assumptions. But 1) the Swordfish planes used to deploy mines are actually torpedo bombers (just give a look to the Taranto raid, some 3 months later) 2) if they were to deploy mines, they would stay at very low altitude 3) if the task was to "drop magnetic mines in the path of the French ships' route to sea", that likely meant that the mines would be dropped within the harbour itself, i.e. extremely close to the ships [this is not foolproof, because it strongly depends on the exact wording of a sentence on wikipedia] 4) point (2) (perhaps reinforced by point 3) means that the flying pattern of the Swordfish was extremely similar to the one usef for an attack mission - torpedo bombers typically launched from low altitude, and from distances of hundreds of yards from the target 5) the decision to scramble the fighters was likely taken as soon as the british planes were sighted... realistically, when they were still at some miles from the harbour (especially if the french had radar; I don't know if they did): do you really think that they could distinguish the exact armament onboard from such a distance? 6) according to wikipedia, the plane that was shot down was one of the escorts, not one of the torpedo bombers: this means that the french pilot might have been unaware of what the Swordfish were doing.