Just curious if my colleagues here believe the Poles were being obstinate from March to August 1939. The Poles refused to negotiate with the Germans over the corridor and refused to receive Russian help. What about the Finns? They were being obstinate and refused to negotiate with the Russians by allowing the Russians to establish military bases in Finland. The Kuwaitis refused to negotiate over the Iraqi war debt, oil overproduction production, and slant drilling.

Just curious if the logic is consistent. Is the aggressor always right?

Refusal to give up territory is not obstinate in the least, comparing a demand for a viable nation to give up land to a homeless fleet disarming is comparing apples to turds. The situation with Germany was not a known loss at the time (it sure was a big loss in the end, but at the time the Poles hoped their allies would help, and to invite the Soviet army onto your land...really???)

Your comparison is foolish. The French were no longer a nation, the fleet in question was in a no-win situation, they had no bargaining power. It was a situation they could only lose THAT is the definition of obstinate now isn't it?

It was clear that the English and French weren't going to help Poland by May 1939 when they refused to extend loans for the Poles to buy military equipment. The Czechoslovak army was better equipped ( than the Polish army and they didn't dare fight the Germans. The Poles even threatened war with the Russians if the Russians tried to help Czechoslovakia by passing through Polish territory in 1938. Even the Rumanians, who hated the Russians as much as the Poles did, were willing to allow transit of the Soviet airforce to help aid the Czechoslovaks. That seems like Poland was being obstinate to me. Especially since all Poland had to do was give up a city that was wholly German and allow communication links with it. Numerous proposals that even Poland's allies though were reasonable were submitted for their approval. They refused to even negotiate. The French fleet was willing to accommodate British demands.

"Your comparison is foolish. The French were no longer a nation, the fleet in question was in a no-win situation"

You're right. They could either accept the British ultimatum and have the rest of France occupied by the Germans and potentially even have the French Empire taken from them, or they could risk the loss of a few ships and resist the ultimatum. In the end Gensoul made the right choice.

France was still a nation. It retained control of southern France and almost the entirety of its Empire. Evidence of their continued existence is the fact that they put up fierce resistance in Syria and other places.

@Tom: what about http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massacre_of_the_Acqui_Division ?
the situation is as similar as you can get to the one in Mers-el-Kebir, with the germans asking the italians to either join or disarm.

OK, so the US demands Canada give up the Niagara escarpment.
According to your own logic, Canada would be obstinate to do anything but surrender the land! Nope, your suggestion is foolish to try and compare!

in the end Gensoul made the right choice?
So you think his no win position that resulted in the death f over 1000 men to be the right choice? You also know more than deGaul? Nope, Gensoul was a FOOL and he wrote the death warrant of each of those men himself!

Excuse me there was a failure to communicate. The British government mistranslated the text of the Armistice with Germany and Italy, which was a big source of their concern about the French fleet falling into Axis hands. The mistranslated word was "contrôle". In French it means to inspect, the British thought it meant operational control.

As for de Gaulle, what did you expect? He was outraged by the attack but what could he do but put a positive spin on it. He initially threatened to relocate to Canada. He was one of the people telling the British that there was no way the French would ever turn over the fleet to the Axis. But he couldn't very well condemn the very people who he is trying to recruit French soldiers to fight for. The Mers al Kebir attack devastated efforts to recruit Frenchmen to the Allied side. It was a political disaster for the British.

@Schwarzenberg: what you say about mis-translation is plausible. However, in what language was the treaty signed? French, German, or both? If the treaty was signed in French, then you're right (at least if you trust Hitler's word). If there existed a German-language version, it depends on which German word was used to give the meaning of "contrôle": something meaning "operational control", or something meaning "inspect" (or something else)?

About the British admirals, you're obviously right. For example, Churchill's memoirs (Their Finest Hour, Chapter 11) report the following telegram sent by Somerville to the British government on July 1:
> After talk with Holland and others Vice-Admiral “Force H” is impressed with their
> view that the use of force should be avoided at all costs. Holland considers
> offensive action on our part would alienate all French wherever they are.
[Holland was the guy who was later sent to parlay with Gensoul]

I have no idea about how this mistranslated word applies, but Control or Inspect, if it has to do with the Germans "Controlling" the fleet or it has the Germans "Inspecting" the fleet, not too much difference to me! If the Germans would not inspect anothers fleet but rather they would inspect what is already theirs. Again, I don't know the exact context but it seems to make sense that the Germans at least wanted to assume ownership of the fleet. Could you point out the context of this word? If used as I can only GUESS (and I do not want to guess), it really isn't much difference at all.

and even if true, the whole thing should never have happened but does not change the fact that IT DID and the French (or Gensoul in particular) was foolish, he was trying to negotiate when in a defenseless position. And his refusal to budge ...where did his loyalties lie? To an overthrown nation? To a loose ragtag nation on the run? or to his men?

No doubt about it, he was being arrogant and brash, full of self worth. In his situation he should have surrendered, surrender happens all the time in war when faced with a position one simply can not win and THIS situation was even worse, it was a somewhat "friendly" transfer of power to an ally, it allowed your men to live, allowed them to return to France and allowed the ships to return after the war was over. No, his decision was flat out WRONG, all these other things brought up change absolutely nothing. Maybe it should never have happened? Maybe (maybe not) but it still does not change the situation in the least!

I think it's worth reading Churchill's version [Their finest hour, Chap. 11]
> Article 8 of the Armistice prescribed that the French Fleet,
> except that part left free for safeguarding French Colonial
> interests, “shall be collected in ports to be specified and
> there demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian
> control.” It was therefore clear that the French war vessels
> would pass into that control while fully armed.
Churchill clearly assumed that "controle"="control", i.e. that the treaty said that german or italian crews were supposed to carry out the demobilization of the ships. Instead, if "controle"="inspect", I take it to mean that the French themselves should carry out the demobilization, with a few German/Italian officers checking that it was not a fake. Nobody knows whether the difference actually mattered to the British government (and see my doubts about the german-language version), but there is a chance.

If the Germans were inspecting this, I don't blame the Brits in the least. Makes little to no difference in the least! Does it change ANYTHING?
Either way you are assuming the Germans will honor this Armistice and disarm the fleet, under their control or under their inspection, you are relying on the Germans honoring their word and ignoring adding a BIG (and free) addition to their navy. Yeah, the Germ,ans honored the previous WW1 armistice, they honored the deal made with Czechoslovakia taking only the Sudetenland, they were such an honorable and trustworthy nation!? And yes, they would indeed pass into "control" (control or "under inspection" is the same thing in this example) of the Germans. Your assumption is just that, instead this would certainly mean the Germans (or Italians) were calling the shots.

Here is the armistice treaty in French.

http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/1940armistice.htm

As you can see, it says "La flotte de guerre française - à l'exception de la partie qui est laissée à la disposition du Gouvernement français pour la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans son empire colonial - sera rassemblée dans des ports à déterminer et devra être démobilisée et désarmée sous *le contrôle* de l'Allemagne ou respectivement de l'Italie."

Here is the German text.

http://www.zaoerv.de/10_1940/10_1940_1_4_b_851_2_860_1.pdf

In the German it says

"Die französische kriegsflotte ist -ausgenommen jener Teil, der für die Wahrung der französische Interessen in ihrem Kolonialreich der französischen Regierung freigegeben wird, - in näher zu bestimmenden Häfen zusammenzuziehen und unter deutscher btw. italienischer Kontrolle demobilzumachen und abzurüsten. "

Kontrolle in German also means inspection.

http://www.dict.cc/?s=Kontrolle

Here is the original text of Article 8 of the armistice that was signed on June 22 1940 by France and by Germany (http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/1940armistice.htm) :

**************************************************

Article 8.

La flotte de guerre française - à l'exception de la partie qui est laissée à la disposition du Gouvernement français pour la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans son empire colonial - sera rassemblée dans des ports à déterminer et devra être démobilisée et désarmée sous le contrôle de l'Allemagne ou respectivement de l'Italie.
La désignation de ces ports sera faite d'après les ports d'attache des navires en temps de paix. Le gouvernement allemand déclare solennellement au Gouvernement français qu'il n'a pas l'intention d'utiliser pendant la guerre, à ses propres fins, la flotte de guerre française stationnée dans les ports sous contrôle allemand, sauf les unités nécessaires à la surveillance des côtes et au dragage des mines.
Il déclare, en outre, solennellement et formellement, qu'il n'a pas l'intention de formuler de revendications à l'égard de la flotte de guerre française lors de la conclusion de la paix ; exception faite de la partie de la flotte de guerre française à déterminer qui sera affectée à la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans l'empire colonial, toutes les unités de guerre se trouvant en dehors des eaux territoriales
françaises devront être rappelées en France.

**************************************************

Here is an English translation made by myself. I have tried to stay as faithful as possible to the original French text :

**************************************************

The French war fleet - except that part which is left at the disposal of the French government for the safeguard of the French interests in its colonial empire - shall be gathered in ports that are still to be determined and will have to be demobilized and disarmed under Germany's or respectively Italy's control.
The designation of these ports will be made according to the home ports of the vessels in peace time. The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that he does not intend to use during the war, for its own purposes, the French war fleet stationed in ports under German control, except the units necessary for the coasts surveillance and for minesweeping.
It declares, additionnally, solemnly and formally, that it does not intend to make claims about the French war fleet at the conclusion of peace ; with the exception of the part of the French war fleet that is still to be determined and that will be assigned to the safeguard of the French interests in the colonial empire, all war units that are outside French territorial waters will have to be recalled in France.

**************************************************

If there is any question or criticism about my translation, I will of course glady accept them.

The original text is 100% clear : the French war fleet will not be used by the Axis powers.
And there is no possible misunderstanding about the word "control" :
- the first time that the word "control" is used, it clearly means "surveillance".
- the second time that the word "control" is used, it clearly refers to "ports that are under German control".


Hitler' goal with that armistice are :
1° In the long term : Hitler does not want that France becomes again a great military power.
2° In the short term : Hitler does not want that the French fleet nor the French air force rejoin the UK and keep fighting Germany.

-> So Hitler did not want to use the French fleet, no : he wanted that the French Fleet was not used by the UK.
By the way, Mussolini had required that the French fleet and the French air force would be placed at his disposal but Hitler refused it and justified his refusal by the fact that it was much more important that France does not keep fighting the war from his colonial empire.

In these kind of questions, it is irrelevant to wonder if the people would have been faitful to what they signed. The real question is to know everyone's true goals : that is something that you can trust. Hitler did not want that France kept fighting from his colonial empire and he was willing to not use the French Fleet in order to achieve that goal.

OK, so we have two nations that want to do the same exact thing. The UK demands were (basically) the same as the German promise, to disarm the fleet. So we come down to who we can trust more. Based on Germany's history of broken promises at the time, I have problem with the British wanting to make certain it actually happened. It was do it themselves and be certain or hope the Germans would honor their word. Hitler had shown over and over that his word meant nothing, one lie led to another and another, I have zero problem with the English decision and in fact think it was the prudent thing to do.

So we come full circle, Gensoul was in a no win situation. He was in no position to defend himself and was a sitting duck, the demands by the British were pretty much the same as what he was supposed to do with Germany, he had no bargaining power, yet he chose to hold fast and in fact chose to send over 1000 men to their graves!
That was flat out wrong.

@Schwarzenberg: thanks (especially for checking the german version)

@Retillion: thanks to you, too. I knew that Hitler denied most Italian requests about France because he didn't want to "force" the French to keep fighting; but I always thought these requests were about colonies, not about the fleet.
However, I think there is a slight inconsistency between the treaty and your interpretation of Hitler's "goals": why should the demobilization have happened in ports that were to be designated "according to the home ports of the vessels in peace time", and not in the ports where the ships were located? I can't help thinking that many of the "home ports" were likely to be in the occupied region, where a violent takeover would be much simpler than in Oran/Mers-el-Kebir, or even in Toulon.

"Yeah, the Germ,ans honored the previous WW1 armistice"

The armistice (Nov. 11, 1918) they in fact did honor. They signed the armistice and put up with the continued blockade after being told that there would be moderate peace terms, which there were not.

" they honored the deal made with Czechoslovakia taking only the Sudetenland"

Technically speaking the Czechs agreed to the German protectorate, so no deal was broken.

"Your assumption is just that, instead this would certainly mean the Germans (or Italians) were calling the shots."

If the Germans wanted the fleet they could have taken it by making it part of the terms of the armistice. They did not.

"And his refusal to budge"

He did 'budge'. He offered to disarm the ships in the Algerian ports. That offer was declined.

"In his situation he should have surrendered, surrender happens all the time in war when faced with a position one simply can not win and THIS situation was even worse, it was a somewhat "friendly" transfer of power to an ally, it allowed your men to live, allowed them to return to France and allowed the ships to return after the war was over."

It was not a transfer to an ally. France was under German occupation in the north and had signed an armistice. Transferring the fleet to the British meant renewed war with Germany. You cannot simultaneously insist that France surrender in one case while refusing to recognize the much more dangerous position they were in vis-a-vis Germany.

And you defend other countries refusing to surrender even in cases they cannot win, which makes me believe you are holding France to a different standard simply because it is England who is the aggressor as opposed to Germany.

"It was do it themselves and be certain or hope the Germans would honor their word."

No the choice was between do it themselves or hope the French would honor their word about scuttling the fleet if the Germans tried to seize it. This was a case of the English not trusting the French, it had nothing to do with trusting the Germans. This decision came after the English saving their own skin at Dunkirk and refusing to send air support or hold the line during the Battle of France. It was a series of a long line of decisions which alienated the French. If you think that was good diplomacy, well then we'll have to agree to disagree.

@Schwarzenberg:
> Technically speaking the Czechs agreed to the German protectorate,
> so no deal was broken.
I hope you don't really mean it: or you believe that a contract signed while you point a gun to my head is valid?

> He did 'budge'. He offered to disarm the ships in the Algerian ports. That offer
> was declined.
I saw on the French wikipedia that Gensoul likely wanted to scuttle/disarm in place.. but also that he was awaiting for permission from Vichy. I know wikipedia is not to be given too much credit; but can you provide the source of this information?

> No the choice was between do it themselves or hope the French would
> honor their word about scuttling the fleet if the Germans tried to seize it.
here you are going against what you were saying about the mis-translation [or perhaps I missed something?].
I mean, I would agree with you if the British had a proper translation of "controle". But
if the British believed (because of the mis-translation) that the axis would get an easy chance to seize the French fleet against France's will, then they were not trusting the Germans, not the French.

"I hope you don't really mean it: or you believe that a contract signed while you point a gun to my head is valid?"

In international relations it is. The history of small or weak countries signing treaties due to gunboat diplomacy is a very long one and there are plenty of examples. These treaties have always been held as valid. In any case the state of Czecho-Slovakia had collapsed so how relevant was the Munich treaty by March 15,1939? As it was the signatories had not bothered to guarantee Czech borders in 1938 when Hungary took Carpatho-Ukraine and Poland took Teschen.

"I know wikipedia is not to be given too much credit; but can you provide the source of this information?

A journal article written by Philippe Lasterle in Journal of Military History, Volume 67, Issue 3, pages 835-844.

It says the following:

"At 2:15 P.M., forty-five minutes before the expiration of the ultimatum, and fully aware of Somerville's intentions, Gensoul played his last card and decided to receive Holland, accompanied by Lieutenant Commander Davies, aboard the Dunkerque. The "dramatic encounter" took place in Gensoul's cabin and "lasted nearly an hour and a half" 34 . Seeking a way out of this impasse that could be acceptable to both parties, the French Admiral proposed a gentleman's agreement: the "disarmament of all [his] ships in place," 35 which was precisely what the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, had previously suggested. Holland considered the offer as the basis for a possible accord but he, of course, had to consult Admiral Somerville."

"But
if the British believed (because of the mis-translation) that the axis would get an easy chance to seize the French fleet against France's will, then they were not trusting the Germans, not the French."

But as the French continually insisted that they would not let the ships fall into German hands, there was a great element of mistrust between the two allies.

wow, just wow! Yep, Hitler was a stand-up guy who could be trusted. You want to believe that, then there really is no reason to continue this debate. Sorry, but you frankly lose any and all credibility with that position!

Tomahaha,

You just got done criticizing me for drawing implied conclusions that were not warranted, and yet you claim I think Hitler was a 'stand-up guy', which I never suggested anywhere.

@ Schwarzenberg

> In international relations it is. The history of small or weak countries signing
> treaties due to gunboat diplomacy is a very long one and there are plenty of
> examples. These treaties have always been held as valid.
I'm sorry my analogy is legally wrong (I should have imagined that this is one point where international law is different from the law within a state). Nonetheless, I think it says something about the level of trust that Hitler deserved.

> state of Czecho-Slovakia had collapsed so how relevant was the Munich
> treaty by March 15,1939? As it was the signatories had not bothered to
> guarantee Czech borders in 1938 when Hungary took Carpatho-Ukraine
> and Poland took Teschen.
again, technically it's true. But sounds like a case of Chutzpah (killing your parents and then asking forgiveness because you're an orphan).

Thanks a lot for the JMH paper. I found a link to the abstract [ http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/journal_of_military_history/v067/67.3lasterle.html ] and I'll try to find a library with access to it.

> But as the French continually insisted that they would not let the ships fall
> into German hands, there was a great element of mistrust between the two
> allies.
If you mean that the British (just Churchill?) thought that the French would be unable to keep their words, there certainly was (for example, Darlan's letter to Churchill says "One day Lord Halifax sent me word by M. Dupuy that in England my word was not doubted, but that it was believed that I should not be able to keep it.")

I don't think the crisis in Czechia indicates anything about trustworthiness, honestly. Seapower was not emphasized by Germany at this time. Subsequent events demonstrate that the attack was gratuitous. Even when Germany was having difficulties planning for Sea Lion, and had lost a number of vessels during the invasion of Norway, they did not take the French fleet, and the French did not volunteer it either even though they had every reason to want revenge.

@Schwarzenberg
you're likely more informed than me, but I think we disagree on three accounts:
- the "judgement" over the Czechia crisis (however, that's more an emotional issue than a factual one)
- The "gratuitous" adjective - I would say it was unnecessary (unfortunate?), but also understandable [however, I have to admit some doubt about the "official" British version - see below]
- The "revenge" sentence: not that some (most?) French didn't want to get even: but not through the germans (furthermore, giving the fleet to the Germans was tantamount to confirming that the British were right in not trusting them)

Finally, I re-red Churchill's account of the facts in detail... and I think it really stinks.
In fact:
1) He first says that "Nothing but the most direct orders compelled them [Somerville and his officers] to open fire"
2) therefore, he says, the the cabinet felt compelled to send a message (at 6:26) saying "French ships must comply with our terms or sink themselves or be sunk by you before dark." [btw, here the self-sinking option finally appears]
3) however, the dispatch proved useless because the action had begun at 5:54, and Somerville reported that at 6:00.
If (1) was true, how could Somerville open fire without a direct order? [perhaps because of the French shooting down a British plane?]
Even stranger, why would the cabinet send a message half an hour after being informed that the action had started?

"the "judgement" over the Czechia crisis (however, that's more an emotional issue than a factual one)"

You're probably right there. I don't think it has to do with trust simply because England initially said on March 14, 1939 that the independence of Slovakia meant the Munich treaty was no longer valid, only to several days later completely change their position (due to a revolt by Conservative MPs in the parliament). Certainly they had no objections to Hungary taking Carpatho-Ukraine without even a pretext of consent from the Ruthenians (which occurred at the same time), or to Lithuania's earlier take-over of Memel, or the Polish territorial claims and mobilization to invade Slovakia and seize Hrosow, Petrwald, East Beskids, the Jablunka Pass, and Hemanice from March 4-March 13, 1939. Certainly they also did not have any objections to compulsory and intrusive protectorates, seeing as how that condition had applied to Egypt-Sudan for quite some time. The issue was not one of morality, trust, self-determination or broken-promises but the balance of power.

" giving the fleet to the Germans was tantamount to confirming that the British were right in not trusting them"

I'd say that's a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you attack people for being 'untrustworthy', they start to side with your enemies. Fortunately for the English that didn't happen with the French, but they would not be blamed if they did.

"2) therefore, he says, the the cabinet felt compelled to send a message (at 6:26) saying "French ships must comply with our terms or sink themselves or be sunk by you before dark." [btw, here the self-sinking option finally appears]"

That time seems off. Are you sure he didn't mean 5:26? Negotiations were halted by direct intervention from the Prime Minister at 5:20. Anyway the ultimatum had technically expired at 3:00, so I don't know what Churchill means by direct orders.

Also I had never heard of this plane being shot down. According to the article I mentioned, the English opened fire at 5:56 (with their ships anchored and the main battleships not in position to return fire) and Gensoul returned fire. There was no mention of any plane being shot down or even being involved.

The British lost two people in the battle, they were flying the plane that was dropping the magnetic mines to keep the fleet in place. The French downed the plane and the fireworks resulted! The first shot was fired by the French and the Brits retaliated.